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Abstract
Background: Existing epidemiological models have largely tended to neglect the impact of individual behaviour on
the dynamics of diseases. However, awareness of the presence of illness can cause people to change their behaviour
by, for example, staying at home and avoiding social contacts. Such changes can be used to control epidemics but
they exact an economic cost. Our aim is to study the costs and beneﬁts of using individual-based social distancing
undertaken by healthy individuals as a form of control.
Methods: Our model is a standard SIR model superimposed on a spatial network, without and with addition of
small-world interactions. Disease spread is controlled by allowing susceptible individuals to temporarily reduce their
social contacts in response to the presence of infection within their local neighbourhood. We ascribe an economic
cost to the loss of social contacts, and weigh this against the economic beneﬁt gained by reducing the impact of the
epidemic. We study the sensitivity of the results to two key parameters, the individuals’ attitude to risk and the size of
the awareness neighbourhood.
Results: Depending on the characteristics of the epidemic and on the relative economic importance of making
contacts versus avoiding infection, the optimal control is one of two extremes: either to adopt a highly cautious
control, thereby suppressing the epidemic quickly by drastically reducing contacts as soon as disease is detected; or
else to forego control and allow the epidemic to run its course. The worst outcome arises when control is attempted,
but not cautiously enough to cause the epidemic to be suppressed. The next main result comes from comparing the
size of the neighbourhood of which individuals are aware to that of the neighbourhood within which transmission
can occur. The control works best when these sizes match and is particularly ineﬀective when the awareness
neighbourhood is smaller than the infection neighbourhood. The results are robust with respect to inclusion of
long-range, small-world links which destroy the spatial structure, regardless of whether individuals can or cannot
control them. However, addition of many non-local links eventually makes control ineﬀective.
Conclusions: These results have implications for the design of control strategies using social distancing: a control
that is too weak or based upon inaccurate knowledge, may give a worse outcome than doing nothing.
Background
Network models have been successfully used to describe
the spread of many infectious diseases, ranging from
human [1-8] through animal [6,9-11] to plant diseases
[12]. In these models, individuals are represented as nodes
and potential contacts between individuals as edges of
the underlying network. Much work has been devoted
to studying how networks are assembled [13-15] and
to analysing the eﬀect of network topology on disease
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spread and potential control strategies [16]. However, the
structure of interactions between individuals is most com-
monly assumed to be ﬁxed and so represents an ‘average’
behavioural pattern. Thus, conventional epidemiological
models either treat human behaviour as external to the
disease system or even ignore it completely [17,18].
The structure of real-life networks is, however, far from
static and often responds to epidemic spread at both
individual and at population level. Thus, for example,
governments often introduce control measures aimed at
disrupting disease transmission either locally or on long-
range links [19-21]. Targeted social distancing may be
promoted by governments and public health bodies as a
© 2012 Maharaj and Kleczkowski; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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strategy for the control of epidemics, for example in the
form of school or workplace closures. The eﬀectiveness
of such measures is typically assessed by macroeconomic
cost-beneﬁt analysis, often based upon large-scale Com-
putational General Equilibrium models [5,22-28].
Social distancing also arises spontaneously as
individuals respond to news about disease spread,
obtained from media reports, public announcements,
rumours or individual experience [29]. Recognising the
importance of behavioural responses, epidemiological
modellers have begun to consider transmission via adap-
tive networks [15,30,31], whereby the structure of the
network is modiﬁed depending on the state of individ-
uals. Thus, changes in contact network structure can
arise as a result of human responses to disease, such
as a reduction in social contacts. Such models have
shown that social distancing can be eﬀective at reducing
the attack rate of an epidemic [28,32] and that it is a
plausible explanation for certain phenomena arising in
real epidemics, such as multiple outbreaks or waves of
infection [32,33].
Existing studies have, however, tended to neglect the
associated cost to both society and individuals resulting
from the actions of individuals leading to severing social
links. Social contacts are necessary for economic activity:
employees must go to work, students must go to school,
and traders and customers must interact in order for an
economy to function. Social contacts are also important
to individuals for non-monetary reasons, such as interac-
tions with family and friends. Awareness of an epidemic
therefore presents each individual with a private choice
between investing in social contacts and risking infection,
or reducing the contacts and losing the social or economic
beneﬁts [34]. This can have a severe impact on both indi-
vidual and societal well-being as it has been noted that
for example ‘(...) fear of exposure can result in signiﬁcant
worker absenteeism’ [35].
In this paper we study the economic impact of social
distancing as a disease control strategy undertaken by
healthy individuals in response to either local infor-
mation about the number of cases in their immediate
neighbourhood or global information communicated by
mass media. We take into account two factors: the eco-
nomic cost of individuals falling ill, and the economic
cost of reduction in social contacts. For simplicity we do
not distinguish between contacts for diﬀerent purposes,
treating all contacts as if they have the same economic
worth. Our model is based upon a standard SIR model
superimposed upon a simple spatial network. Computer
simulations are used to study the eﬀect of allowing sus-
ceptible individuals to reduce their contacts when their
surrounding neighbourhood contains infected individu-
als. One important parameter we use is the risk atti-
tude, which models how strongly individuals respond to
the awareness of a threat. Another important param-
eter is the awareness neighbourhood, which represents
the size of the area that individuals are knowledgeable
about. Our main result is that, in order for social dis-
tancing to be a cost-eﬀective strategy, it must be applied
with a highly cautious attitude to risk. We also see that
the size of the awareness neighbourhood matters: for
best results, this should be the same as the size of the
neighbourhood within which disease transmission can
occur. In particular, the control is most eﬀective if the
response is based on local knowledge – the result of mass
media-induced panic is to reduce the eﬀectiveness of the
spontaneous control.
In this paper we consider two network models. The ﬁrst
one is a regular network which has the advantage of sim-
plicity but is only a crude representation of real social
networks which often display amixture of short-range and
long-range links.We therefore also consider a small-world
model that is more realistic in this respect [13,36,37], with
long-range links representing occasional travel of indi-
viduals. The main result of our paper is robust to the
addition of even a relatively high number of long-range
links, although if the network becomes very random, the
optimal response is to refrain from any action. In this
case, the highly cautious risk attitude leads to a limited but
long epidemic causing large losses in contact numbers as
individuals repeatedly respond to the threat.
Methods
The model of infection is based upon a standard SIR
model superimposed upon a simple spatial network with
neighbourhoods deﬁned by Euclidean distance, without
and with addition of long-range links. Each individual
has an infection neighbourhood whose size, and hence
the number of contacts made by that individual, depends
locally on the infection pressure and therefore changes
throughout the epidemic. The model includes an eco-
nomic cost-beneﬁt analysis which evaluates the overall
beneﬁts to the global population arising from local indi-
vidual responses to infection levels.
Spatial model
For simplicity, we assume that individuals are located
at nodes of a square lattice representing their geo-
graphical distribution. We assume no-contact boundary
conditions, but we have found that boundary wrap-
ping has little eﬀect on the results. Each node of the
lattice holds a single individual, which may be either
susceptible, infected, or removed/recovered. On the lat-
tice we deﬁne a neighbourhood of radius r centered
at a node (i0, j0), determined by Euclidean distance,{
(i, j) s.t.
√
(i− i0)2 + (j− j0)2 ≤ r
}
. For each individual
two types of neighbourhoods are considered, describing
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Figure 1 Structure of the awareness and infection neighbourhoods for the case with a small infection pressure (a) and large infection
pressure (b). Susceptible individuals are shown as grey circles and infected individuals as black circles. For clarity no recovered individuals are
shown in this example and only individuals in the awareness neighbourhood (large dotted circle) are represented. The infection neighbourhood
(thick-lined circle) varies in response to increased infection pressure (cf. (b) with (a)).
two network topologies, see Figure 1. The infection neigh-
bourhood is characterised by radius ri and describes
spread of the infection, whereas the awareness neighbour-
hood deﬁnes the area of inﬂuence on individual deci-
sions, and is determined by the radius ra. Both radii
can range from 0 (no neighbours) to inﬁnity (whole
population), although in practice inﬁnity is represented
by a ﬁnite value big enough to encompass the whole
population. The awareness neighbourhood is uniform
for all individuals and ﬁxed for the duration of each
epidemic, whereas the infection neighbourhood varies
locally depending on the infection pressure (for details
see below). The number of individuals in each neighbour-
hood is proportional to the radius squared and we denote
by Na the number of nodes in each awareness neigh-
bourhood and by Ni the number of nodes in each infec-
tion neighbourhood. Initially all individuals are assigned
the same baseline infection neighbourhood with radius
r
(0)
i leading to the number of individuals N
(0)
i in each
infection neighbourhood.
The epidemiological model is based upon an SIR
(Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model [38] (see
Figure 2). All individuals are initially susceptible (S)
and the epidemic is initiated by the introduction of few
infected individuals (I) at random locations in the net-
work. Each susceptible individual is aﬀected by all infected
individuals within its infection neighbourhood indepen-
dently of their distance. Each contact between an infected
and a susceptible individual may result in the susceptible
becoming infected, with probability p per contact (and
per time step). At each time step, each infected individual
may become recovered, with probability q. Recovered
individuals cannot be reinfected. The epidemic ends when
all infected individuals recover. The simulation proceeds
through discrete time steps (so that each probability can
be interpreted as a hazard) up to a maximum number of
steps, chosen to be suﬃciently large to allow all epidemics
to run to completion. Although our model is generic and
so does not depend on a choice of a particular time step,
we envisage our model to apply to relatively fast-spreading
epidemics. Thus, for simplicity we assume the time step
equal to one day with most epidemics ﬁnished in less than
120 days.
Social distancing is introduced by allowing susceptible
individuals to temporarily reduce the number of con-
tacts they make in response to the presence of nearby
infection. Thus, each susceptible individual can detect the
current infection pressure amongst its neighbours within
the awareness radius, ra. The local infection pressure, ,
is the ratio of the number of infected individuals in radius
ra to the total number of neighbours within that radius.
For any given susceptible individual,  may take values
ranging from 0, meaning that there are no infected neigh-
bours in radius ra, to 1, meaning that all neighbours within
radius ra are infected.
How strongly susceptible individuals react to the cur-
rent infection pressure depends upon another control
parameter, α (risk attitude), which represents the degree
of caution used in applying the control. Intuitively, when a
population is more cautious, or more risk-averse, suscep-
tible individuals will react more strongly by reducing their
contacts more drastically in response to a given infection
pressure. Thus, if a susceptible individual detects an infec-
tion pressure at the current time step, then the number
of contacts that susceptible will make during the next time
step is adjusted by choosing a new contact radius r′i and
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Figure 2 Block diagram illustrating transitions in the model considered in the paper. Solid lines represent transitions performed at each time
step. Dashed line illustrates change in behaviour inﬂuenced by infection pressure. Dotted lines identify parameters aﬀecting each transition.
the corresponding new number of individuals within its
infection neighbourhood
Ni = N
(0)
i
(
1−α
)
, (1)
see Figure 3. This formula ensures that if no infection
is present within a susceptible’s awareness radius ( =
0), it will resume full contact by reverting to the initial,
maximum contact radius r
(0)
i . Increased local infection
pressure causes the infection radius and hence the number
of contacts to decrease.
Lower values of α represent more cautious (more risk-
averse) attitudes to risk, and result in a greater reduction
Figure 3 The role of risk attitude in modiﬁng the number of contacts in response to the local infection pressure. The curves illustrate (from
top to bottom) risk-seeking, risk-neutral, and increasingly more risk-averse.
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of ri for a given . For completeness, Figure 3 also
illustrates ‘risk-neutral’ and ‘risk-seeking’ responses, rep-
resented by the upper two lines. The risk-neutral case is
one in which susceptibles do not modify their behaviour,
and is equivalent to no control being used: here r′i =
r
(0)
i , regardless of the infection pressure. The risk-seeking
case represents a response in which susceptibles seek to
increase their contacts as the infection pressure increases,
modelled by the formula Ni = N
(0)
i (1+
α). Risk-
seeking response was not considered in this study, though
we note that such seemingly perverse behaviour was
observed [39] in a virtual ‘epidemic’ in an online computer
game.
For contact to occur between two individuals, each one
must be within the contact neighbourhood of the other.
At each time step, any two individuals a and b will make
contact, provided that each is within the other’s contact
radius, i.e., if d is the Euclidean distance between a and
b, then i and j will make contact provided that d < ri(a)
and d < ri(b). We assume that all individuals are aware
of their own status (susceptible, infected, or recovered)
and take this into account when deciding how to respond.
Susceptible individuals reduce their contact neighbour-
hood because they know they are at risk of becoming
infected, whereas infected and recovered individuals no
longer have this risk and so do not reduce their contact
neighbourhood.
Economic benefit
To compare the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent control strategies
we measure the net economic beneﬁt of applying the con-
trol. There are two aspects to be considered. Firstly, the
control produces an economic gain if it causes a reduc-
tion in the overall impact of the epidemic. To measure
this, we look at the number of recovered individuals at
the end of the epidemic, R∞, and take the diﬀerence
between the cases where control is used andwhere it is not
used
Rdiff = R∞ (no control)− R∞ (control) . (2)
The value of R∞ (no control) is obtained by taking
the mean of 20 simulation runs where control is not
used. Similarly, R∞ (control) is the mean of 20 runs with
control.
Secondly, the control produces an economic loss by
reducing the number of economically beneﬁcial contacts
taking place between pairs of individuals. To count the
contacts taking place during an epidemic, we sum up the
number of contacts that take place at each time step, over
a ﬁxed reference period. This reference period is chosen
to be equal to 900 time steps which exceeds the duration
of the longest epidemic in our sample (most epidemics
were signiﬁcantly shorter than 900 steps). We identify the
economic beneﬁts with the infection neighbourhood. This
is equivalent to the assumptions that each economically
signiﬁcant contact is associated with an infection risk.
We assume that infected and recovered individuals are
unaﬀected by the control, as they are no longer in dan-
ger of becoming infected, and that they therefore adopt
the maximum contact radius, r
(0)
i . Susceptible individuals,
however, may temporarily adopt a reduced contact radius,
as explained above. This leads to a reduction in the total
number of contacts when control is used, compared to the
case when it is not used,
Cdiff = contacts (no control)− contacts (control) . (3)
For any given r
(0)
i , the value of contacts (no control) is
ﬁxed: each individual will make contact with all of its
neighbours within radius r
(0)
i , so a ﬁxed number of con-
tacts occurs at each time step, and contacts (no control)
can be calculated bymultiplying this number by the length
of the reference period. The value of contacts (control) is
obtained by taking the mean of 20 simulation runs with
control.
The overall net beneﬁt of using the control is then cal-
culated by combining the gain from reducing R∞ with the
loss from reducing the number of contacts. The parameter
c represents the relative weight of a single contact com-
pared to a single individual being saved from infection. So,
for example, if we consider a single contact taking place to
be equally valuable as a single case of illness that is pre-
vented, then we would take c = 1. If, however, a contact is
considered to bemore (or less) valuable than a saved infec-
tion, then cwould be chosen to be correspondingly higher
(or lower). The net beneﬁt, is calculated as
 = Rdiff − c× Cdiff . (4)
Small-worldmodel
In order to construct the small-world model [36,37], we
start with the local-spread model as described above.
A ﬁxed number of local links (representing a propor-
tion of all local links) is selected and those connections
are ‘rewired’ to a random location outside the interac-
tion neighbourhood determined by r
(0)
i , thus keeping the
total number of links (local and long-range) constant. For
simplicity we assume that the probability of passing an
infection along any of the long-range links is the same as
for local links.
As described above, in response to infection located
in their awareness neighbourhood susceptible individu-
als reduce their number of local links. We assume that
a similar behaviour governs small-world links. Thus, at
each time step the number of active long-range links
originating from a susceptible individual is proportional
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to (1−α), where  represents the infection pressure
within the awareness neighbourhood of this individual (as
for local links). Infection can only pass along the long-
range link if it is active and joins a susceptible and an
infected individual. Finally, we assume that each active
long-range link contributes to the calculation of the num-
ber of contacts in the same way as local links. Non-active
long-range links do not contribute to the overall number
of contacts.
Simulations
The model was implemented in NetLogo 4.0.4 [40], a
simulation tool for agent-based stochastic simulation.
Figure 4 shows a snapshot of a typical simulation run in
NetLogo. Each run was replicated 20 times, so that in total
over 2 million simulation runs were performed. Multiple,
concurrent simulation runs were carried out on a grid of
about 175 PCs with the help of the Condor distributed
computing tool [41]. The statistical package R [42] was
used to analyse the resulting data.
Simulation runs were performed for a spatial network
consisting of a 50 × 50 square lattice without edge wrap-
ping (total number of individuals, N = 2500), with a ﬁxed
proportion of local links rewired to form a small-world
model as described above. Table 1 lists the parameters
Table 1 Parameters of themodel
Parameter Value Interpretation
p 0.01− 1 probability of infection per contact
(per time step)
q 0.01− 1 probability of removal/recovery
(per time step)
ri 1− 5 contact radius (baseline)
ra 1− 5, 10,∞ awareness radius
α 0.01− 1.0 risk attitude
c 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10 Relative cost
I(0) 10− 400 Initial number of foci (0.4%− 40%)
Without loss of generality, the time step is assumed to be one day.
and the values used in simulation runs. In order to obtain
general results we cover a wide range of values for all
parameters as shown in Table 1. The speciﬁc values shown
in the ﬁgures have been chosen to indicate clearly the
shape of our general results.
Results
We ﬁrst describe results for the regular networks. In the
absence of social distancing, the long-term behaviour of
Figure 4 Snapshot of a simulation run. As the epidemic progresses, susceptibles (grey) close to infected (black) individuals become aware of their
presence and reduce their social contacts. This results in a wall of cautious (light grey) susceptibles surrounding the infecteds, containing the
epidemic and preventing it from reaching those further away. White areas indicate recovered individuals.
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the spatial model depends on−, the probability that infec-
tion is passed to a susceptible individual from any of
its neighbours within the infection neighbourhood, see
Figure 5. For small values of p, the epidemics are short and
limited (small epidemic duration, T , and small ﬁnal epi-
demic size, R∞).When p reaches the threshold value (here
p ≃ 0.1), the epidemic rapidly increases and the duration
time becomes very long. This slowing down is associated
with a critical epidemic, lasting a very long time but cre-
ating relatively few infecteds at each time step. For large
values of p ≫ 0.1, the epidemic becomes very short but
very rapid, with most individuals becoming infected (I)
and eventually recovered (R). This picture is consistent
with traditional models of disease spread on lattices and
the corresponding percolation model [43].
Effect of social distancing
Social distancing (characterised here by a relatively risk-
averse attitude, α = 0.25, see Figure 3) shifts the critical
infectiousness p towards higher values but also generally
increases the duration of the epidemic, Figure 5. For a
given p, social distancing always decreases the ﬁnal size
of the epidemic (Figure 5a), but the eﬀect on the duration
depends on the value of p (Figure 5b). The diﬀerent out-
comes are indicated roughly by the four regions marked
on the graphs, labelled A, B, C, and D, and with the
approximate boundaries between them shown as verti-
cal dotted lines in Figure 5 and in other ﬁgures below.
For small values of p the disease is non-invasive in both
cases, while both the ﬁnal size and the duration of the
epidemic are lower in presence of social distancing than
without it (region A). In regions B and C, the epidemic
without social distancing is invasive, but the behavioural
changes render it non-invasive. However, in region B the
duration of the epidemic is shortened by the distancing,
whereas in region C it is longer. Finally, in region D the
disease is invasive regardless of the social distancing, with
slightly lower ﬁnal size, but signiﬁcantly longer duration.
The approximate boundaries between regions are given
by the transition between invasive and non-invasive dis-
ease for the case without control (boundary between A
and B) and with control (boundary between C and D),
respectively. In addition, the boundary between B and C is
placed at the value of pwhere controlled and uncontrolled
epidemics last approximately the same time, see Figure 5.
The overall number of contacts taking place during an
epidemic is aﬀected by two factors: epidemic size and
duration. Firstly, the size of the epidemic determines how
many individuals are still susceptible, and therefore exer-
cising the control (infected and recovered individuals do
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Figure 5 Eﬀect of control on the ﬁnal size of the epidemic, R∞ (a) and epidemic duration, T (b). Black lines indicate the result with control,
and light grey indicates the result with no control. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error bars showing±1 standard deviation. The
parameter values are: q = 0.5, r
(0)
i = 2, ra = 2, α = 0.25.
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not change their behaviour in our model). A larger epi-
demic also creates a higher infection pressure, leading to
increased reaction. Secondly, the longer the duration of
the epidemic the more pronounced the cumulative eﬀect
of the reduction of contacts. Both factors combine to
reduce the overall number of contacts diﬀerentially over
p, see Figure 6a. The eﬀect is relatively minor in regions
A and B, but becomes very strong in region C, where the
long duration of the epidemic combines with relatively
large number of infections. Finally, in region D, although
the epidemic leads to many cases, it lasts for a relatively
short period of time. This results in a smaller drop in
contact numbers.
The economic impact of the reduction in the num-
ber of contacts can be oﬀset by a reduction in disease
cases caused by the social distancing. The two factors
are weighed by c, the relative cost of social interactions
versus cost of infection. A typical dependence of the net
economic beneﬁt on p for medium values of c is shown
in Figure 6b; we will explore the dependence on c later in
the paper.
Overall, we see that the eﬀect of the control may be neu-
tral, beneﬁcial, or detrimental, with the outcome depend-
ing on the infectiousness of the disease, p. The eﬀect is
diﬀerent in diﬀerent regions A-D. In region A the con-
trol makes little diﬀerence as the disease is not invasive
even in the absence of social distancing. R∞ is small and
the epidemic is of short duration. Using the control causes
a very slight reduction in the number of contacts, and a
correspondingly very small reduction in the net beneﬁt.
As p increases past the uncontrolled epidemic threshold
value, indicated by the boundary between regions A and
B in the graphs, the social distancing leads to a positive
net beneﬁt. The control reduces R∞ almost to zero, and
greatly shortens the duration of the epidemic. Although
the number of contacts is also somewhat reduced, this is
more than compensated for by the large reduction in R∞,
so that the net beneﬁt is strongly positive.
As p increases further, region C, the control becomes
ineﬀective, R∞ rises towards the levels seen without con-
trol, and the duration of the epidemic increases beyond
no-control levels. The picture is of a control that is too
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Figure 6 Number of contacts (a) and net economic beneﬁt (b) as functions of p. Black lines indicate the result with control, and light grey
indicates the result with no control. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error bars showing±1 standard deviation. The parameter
values are: q = 0.5, r
(0)
i = 2, ra = 2, α = 0.25, and c = 0.05.
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weak to suppress the epidemic and ismerely slowing down
the speed of its spread without reducing its ﬁnal impact.
Figure 6a shows a further downside: by prolonging the
epidemic, the control prolongs the period during which
social distancing is practised, thus greatly reducing the
number of contacts. This in turn results in an overall neg-
ative beneﬁt. Eventually, as p enters region D, we reach
the worst case scenario for the control, where using the
control gives a much worse result than doing nothing. As
p increases further beyond this point, we return to a sit-
uation where, as in region A, use of the control makes
little diﬀerence to the severity of the epidemic or its dura-
tion. However, unlike region A, in this case the epidemic is
invasive despite the control. The number of contacts and
the overall beneﬁt both improve slightly from the worst
case scenario, though remaining low.
An interesting observation from these graphs is the
close juxtaposition of the best case scenario with the worst
case, as shown by the steep transition from positive to
negative beneﬁt taking place within region C. This implies
that if social distancing is to be used to control disease, it
is very important to get the parameters right. If the infec-
tiousness of the disease is underestimated even slightly,
the actual outcome of using the control can be substan-
tially worse than anticipated. We shall see later on, when
we consider diﬀerent attitudes to risk and diﬀerent values
of the awareness radius, that the importance of getting the
parameters exactly right is a recurring theme in this work.
Effect of varying c
The parameter c represents the relative weight of a sin-
gle contact between a pair of individuals, compared to a
single case of infection. Changing c causes a vertical shift
in the beneﬁt, that is most signiﬁcant in regions C and
D. However it does not change the overall shape of the
graph, Figure 7. If c = 0 then there is no cost attached to
reducing contacts, so using the control always results in a
non-negative beneﬁt (top line). As c is increased, reducing
contacts has a greater impact, causing a strong downward
shift in regions C and D of the graph where large numbers
of contacts are lost. For the remaining graphs, c = 0.05 is
chosen because it best illustrates the generic behaviour of
the net economic beneﬁt.
Importance of risk attitude
The parameter α represents the attitude to risk that deter-
mines how social distancing is applied. A very low value
of α means highly risk-averse behaviour, causing a strong
control response in which susceptible individuals eﬀec-
tively close down all social contacts if there is any hint
of disease within their awareness radius, Figure 3. Higher
values of α represent more relaxed (less risk-averse) atti-
tudes and will cause a weaker response, particularly at
low infection pressure, . When all individuals are highly
risk averse (α = 0.05), social distancing leads to a posi-
tive beneﬁt for even the most highly infectious diseases,
see Figure 8. The only exception is region A where disease
Figure 7 Net economic beneﬁt as a function of p, for c = 0, c = 0.05 and c = 0.1. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error bars
showing±1 standard deviation. The parameter values are: q = 0.5, r
(0)
i = 2, ra = 2, and α = 0.25.
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Figure 8 Net economic beneﬁt as a function of p, for α = 0.05, α = 0.25 and α = 0.55. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error
bars showing±1 standard deviation. Parameters: q = 0.5, c = 0.05, r
(0)
i = 2 and ra = 2. Only region A is marked as the locations of regions B, C, and
D vary with α.
does not spread even in absence of social distancing, but
changes in behaviour around the initial foci lead to slightly
negative beneﬁt. However, if the risk attitude is made
more relaxed (α = 0.25 and α = 0.55 in Figure 8), the con-
trol becomes less eﬀective for more infectious diseases,
resulting in a worse outcome than doing nothing.
Another way of thinking about these results is in terms
of the four regions, A, B, C, and D, identiﬁed earlier. With
a highly risk-averse value of α, regions C and D vanish,
and region B (corresponding to the diseases for which the
distancing is beneﬁcial) extends from the invasion thresh-
old value of p all the way to p = 1. Relaxing (increasing) α
causes region B to narrow and regions C and D to emerge.
As α is increased further, the boundary between regions
B and C shifts to the left, meaning that the control is
beneﬁcial for a narrower range of diseases.
In Figure 9, we take a diﬀerent view of this data, choos-
ing three diﬀerent diseases (represented by diﬀerent val-
ues of p) and analysing how the beneﬁt changes as α is
varied. For a non-invasive disease (p = 0.01), using the
control has little eﬀect and varying α makes little diﬀer-
ence, although a high value of α represents the optimal
choice corresponding to a maximum value of the ben-
eﬁt. For a moderately infectious disease (represented by
p = 0.25), there is a positive beneﬁt for lower (more risk
averse) values of α, up until a sharp threshold value, after
which the outcome is negative. As α is increased further,
the outcome improves, though remaining negative. These
graphs imply that it is very important to exercise suﬃ-
cient caution in using social distancing. If the control is
just slightly too relaxed and falls on the wrong side of the
threshold, the result will be worse than doing nothing.
For a more infectious disease (p = 0.51), control is only
beneﬁcial if α is extremely risk-averse.
Small-worldmodel
For the case described above when only short-range links
are present in the network, the disease spreads locally
and can therefore be controlled eﬃciently by individuals
reducing their social activities. Addition of randomness
increases the propensity of the disease agent to spread
by allowing it to create new foci in regions where there
is a high density of susceptible individuals. As a result,
the switch from the invasive to the non-invasive disease
occurs for smaller values of p [13,36]. The long-range
links can also make social distancing less eﬀective, as
individuals are responding to infection within their local
neighbourhood and the disease can pass along the long-
range links from outside this neighbourhood. However,
even when 20% (3,000) of links are long-range, this does
not render the control completely ineﬀective, Figure 10
(left column), although it requires a more cautious atti-
tude (smaller α) for it to work. For networks dominated by
long-range spread (as exempliﬁed here by a small-world
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Figure 9 Net economic beneﬁt as a function of α, for p = 0.01, p = 0.25 and p = 0.51. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error
bars showing±1 standard deviation. Parameters: q = 0.5, c = 0.05, r
(0)
i = 2 and ra = 2.
network with 30% long-range links and by a completely
random network), the social distancing breaks down and
the optimal solution is to avoid any reaction to the disease,
Figure 10 (right column).
The process by which inclusion of long-range links
breaks down the usefulness of the social distancing is,
however, not trivial. Two contrasting cases need to be dis-
tinguished, corresponding to a very relaxed risk attitude
(α ∼ 1) and to a very strict response (α ∼ 0), see Figure 10.
Firstly, if individuals do not respond to the local infec-
tion load (large α), the epidemics are usually very quick
(rightmost parts of Figure 10a,b) and infect most of the
individuals in the population (Figure 10c,d). However, the
number of contacts lost to social distancing is also small,
resulting in the net beneﬁt close to 0 (rightmost parts of
Figure 10e,f ).
As the individuals become more cautious in their
response to the infection load, the duration of the epi-
demics goes up (Figure 10a) and the number of cases
goes down (Figure 10c). In the second case, where the
values of α are small, the behaviour depends crucially
on the number of long-range links. For small number of
such contacts, the epidemics are short (leftmost parts of
Figure 10a) and stop after infecting a small number of
individuals (leftmost parts of Figure 10c). As the number
of long-range links increases to 30%, the duration of the
epidemic increases (Figure 10b) and the number of cases
goes up (Figure 10d) but remains short of infecting the
whole population. In this case, epidemics progress slowly,
infecting only few individuals at a time, but resulting in
a massive reduction in the number of contacts over the
whole period of their duration. Further addition of non-
local links results in a faster epidemic aﬀecting a large
number of individuals (Figure 10b,d). For the particu-
lar choice of c in Figure 10 this results in a very similar
value of the net beneﬁt for 30% and 100% non-local links,
although the balance will change when other values of c
are selected (cf. Figure 7).
In this model we assume that the control is applied to
both local and long-range links in the same way. If long-
range links are excluded from the control, it becomes even
less eﬀective, but the results are qualitatively similar to
those described above.
Importance ofmatching spatial scales: regular networks
The model introduces two spatial scales, the infection
(and contact) neighbourhood and the awareness neigh-
bourhood. The infection neighbourhood is associated
with disease transmission and with economic beneﬁts
accruing from social contacts, whereas the role of the
awareness neighbourhood is to provide an estimate of
risks associated with infection. So far in the case of regu-
lar networks we have only considered cases in which the
radius of the awareness neighbourhood ra is equal to that
of the maximum contact radius r
(0)
i . This corresponds to
a situation when individuals base their decisions on the
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Figure 10 Duration (a) and (b), the ﬁnal size of the epidemic (c) and (d) and the net beneﬁt (e) and (f) as a function of α for diﬀerent
numbers of long-range random links. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error bars showing±1 standard deviation. Parameters:
p = 0.25, q = 0.5, c = 0.05, r
(0)
i = 2 and ra = 2. 20% corresponds to 3,000 links, 30% to 4,500 and 100% represents a fully random network.
same social neighbourhood as the infection risk comes
from. However, two other cases need to be considered.
The individuals might be in contact potentially leading to
infection with individuals whose statusmight be unknown
to them. In our approach we simulate this situation by
considering an awareness neighbourhood which is smaller
than the infection neighbourhood. This results in under-
estimation of risks and leads to sub-optimal control of
epidemic spread, as illustrated by ra = 1 < 2 = r
(0)
i
in Figure 11a. The beneﬁt is in this case a monoton-
ically increasing function of α, leading to a maximum
corresponding to a relaxed attitude (large α).
This behaviour is very diﬀerent to the cases when ra ≥
r
(0)
i , i.e. when the individual bases the decisions on a sam-
ple equal or larger than the infection neighbourhood. The
beneﬁt is a non-monotonic function of α with a global
positive maximum at low values of α, a rapid drop to
highly negative values for intermediate α and improving
for large α, Figure 11. However, extension of the aware-
ness neighbourhood beyond r
(0)
i reduces the range of α
for which the beneﬁt is positive and signiﬁcantly lowers
the minimum value of the beneﬁt (Figure 11). In partic-
ular, if the awareness neighbourhood includes the whole
population, ra = ∞, the beneﬁt is negative for all values
of α considered here. Two mechanisms may contribute
to produce this lack of eﬃciency. Firstly, it might be that
individuals reduce contacts unnecessarily in response to
awareness of disease cases that are too far away to pose
a threat. Alternatively, it might be that individuals fail
to protect themselves because the over-large awareness
radius causes them to underestimate the level of infec-
tion amongst their local contacts. Examination of the
simulation data suggests that a combination of these two
mechanisms is responsible for this result, because making
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Figure 11 Net economic beneﬁt as a function of α, for diﬀerent values of ra. Each point is the mean of 20 simulation runs with error bars
showing±1 standard deviation. Parameters: p = 0.25, q = 0.5, c = 0.05, r
(0)
i = 2 and ra takes the values 1, 2 (=r
(0)
i ), and 3 in (a) and 2 (=r
(0)
i ), 10 and
∞ in (b). Note the change of vertical scale between (a) and (b). ra = ∞ is modelled by making the awareness neighbourhood suﬃciently large to
include the whole population.
ra larger than r
(0)
i has the dual eﬀect of causing an increase
in R(∞) and a reduction in the number of contacts. Thus,
the exact match of the awareness and infection neighbour-
hood appears to lead to an optimal case with the widest
range of α for which beneﬁt is positive and the shallowest
drop in the beneﬁt for intermediate values of α.
Importance ofmatching spatial scales: small-world networks
Long-range links provide an alternative way in which
disease can enter the local neighbourhood of the suscep-
tible individuals. The question then arises whether global
awareness of infection cases is able to restore the eﬃ-
ciency of social distancing when the network is dominated
by random links? Figure 12 which shows the results for
the random network suggests that this is not the case; the
results for other numbers of non-local links are very sim-
ilar. The loss of contacts resulting from over-reacting to
infection far dominates the net beneﬁt. However, for ran-
dom networks with a very cautious response (very small
α) global awareness is more eﬃcient than local awareness,
see Figure 12.
Conclusions
Within the assumptions of our model, we have seen that
social distancing is most cost-eﬀective as an epidemic
control strategy if it is applied with a high degree of
caution (i.e., a low risk attitude), and that the more infec-
tious the disease, the greater the caution that is required.
If a disease is very highly infectious, social distancing
may have no eﬀect, or may require an unfeasibly high
degree of caution in order to be eﬀective. In these cases,
doing nothing will be a more cost-eﬀective strategy than
using social distancing, because the worst-case outcome
arises if the control is applied, but the level of caution
used is too weak. The steep threshold separating the best-
case outcome from the worst-case in Figure 6b indicates
that it is very important that the level of infectious-
ness of the disease is not underestimated. The similar,
steep threshold in Figure 9 highlights the danger of hav-
ing an overly relaxed attitude to risk when using the
control. Hence the slogan in the title of this paper: if
social distancing is being considered, do it well, or not
at all.
Maharaj and Kleczkowski BMC Public Health 2012, 12:679 Page 14 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/679
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
−
80
00
0
−
60
00
0
−
40
00
0
−
20
00
0
0
α
be
ne
fit
local awareness
global awareness
Figure 12 Net economic beneﬁt as a function of α, for ra = 2 (local awareness) and ra = ∞ (global awareness) for fully random network.
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i = 2.
We have also seen the importance of having a good
match between the spatial area from which an individ-
ual draws information which will aﬀect his/her behaviour,
and the spatial area containing those other individuals
who actually pose an infection risk. The control works
best when these two areas are the same. If the individ-
ual has too little knowledge and can be infected by others
who are outside of the awareness radius, the control does
not work. If, on the other hand, the individual responds
to infection cases which do not pose a realistic risk of
infection (as might happen if, say, individuals in the UK
change their behaviour in response to mass media reports
of faraway epidemics in distant countries) the control is
also ineﬃcient.
Additional simulation runs were performed to check
the robustness of our results. We looked at the results
of varying the number of initial foci from 0.4% to 40%
of the population (10-1000 infected individuals in popu-
lation of 2500). As the number of foci is increased, the
epidemic reaches more of the population and its dura-
tion is shortened. The control becomes less eﬀective, with
fewer contacts taking place during the reference period
and a reduction in the economic beneﬁt from using the
control. However, the overall shape of the results does
not change. We also checked potential eﬀects of diﬀerent
size and boundary conditions by performing exploratory
runs with diﬀerent assumptions. Edge wrapping has the
eﬀect of slightly increasing R∞ and reducing the duration
of the epidemic, but the overall shape of the graphs
remains the same. Varying the size of the system (ranging
from 400-10000 individuals) has no eﬀect on the results.
We also varied the recovery rate, q, in the range from
0.1 to 0.9; with appropriate scaling of p the results are
consistent with those shown above. Finally, the simula-
tions for small-world networks (up to 30% of long-range
links) and a random network suggest that our results are
fairly robust with respect to making the network structure
more realistic.
Care must be taken in interpreting our results and
attempting to relate them to epidemics in the real world.
The model relies on a number of assumptions which must
be taken into account. First, the disease model is a simple
SIR model. Further work needs to be done to investigate
whether the results hold for other systems, such as SIS or
SEIR models and for real-world social networks. Another
major assumption concerns the way we deal with recov-
ered and infected individuals: we have supposed that these
individuals maintain full contact with others, and that
only susceptible individuals change their behaviour. If we
changed these assumptions, for example, by assuming that
recovered individuals die and cannot therefore engage in
economic contact, or by assuming that infected individ-
uals are weakened and have fewer contacts than healthy
individuals, then our results might diﬀer. This, again, is a
subject for future investigation. Our present conclusions
can only be applied to mild diseases which do not greatly
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aﬀect the behaviour of infected individuals, and do not
typically result in death.
The model can be extended in a number of ways. Cur-
rently we assume that the population is constant and
that recovered individuals cease to be infectious and can-
not be infected again. These assumptions can be relaxed
to include full recovery, births, deaths and other demo-
graphic processes as well as asymptomatic stages of the
disease or indeed asymptomatic carriers. In our model
we do not distinguish between diﬀerent activities and
hence combine day/night cycles into one time step. Sim-
ilarly, we do not include variations in contacts between
weekdays and weekends or schools/holidays. Finally, with
increased availability of data it is possible to analyse exist-
ing social networks in unprecedented detail. Each of these
extensions is possible in agent-based models like ours, but
exceeds the scope of the paper.
In our approach we have made a simple assumption
about the monetary value of each contact (represented
by c) and we assumed that all contacts (whether for mon-
etary or non-monetary reasons) have the same value. This
is clearly only a ﬁrst approximation and an obvious exten-
sion of our model (beyond the scope of the current paper)
is to consider diﬀerent monetary value for diﬀerent con-
tacts. More work is also needed on understanding how
individuals value diﬀerent aspects of their social and eco-
nomic activities, in the light of a possibility of losing
them due to disease control. For simplicity we have also
assumed that the only diﬀerence between the long-range
links and the local links is in the topology of interac-
tions; otherwise the long range links are treated the same
as short-range links, in terms of reduction of contacts in
response to infection and their contribution to the indi-
vidual well-being. This is again a simplifying assumption
as the long-range links may be more likely to be broken in
the presence of infection. Alternatively, individuals trying
to get away from the epidemic foci might increase the
propensity of long-range links, as documented in e.g. [44].
When long-range links are included in the network,
there are three options for the control. Authorities can
either block the travel or strongly advise against it and
individuals might respond to the epidemic threat by com-
pletely refraining from such activities, in which case the
model becomes purely local. At the other extreme, indi-
viduals might not have control over occasional long-range
contacts and the changes in the behaviour will be purely
local. Finally, a mixture of responses is possible, with dif-
ferent behaviour associated with diﬀerent kinds of links.
In our paper we considered all three cases, although for
the last one we assumed that local and long-range links
are treated in the same way.
Other areas for future work could involve extending
the economic and psychological aspects of the model
to capture further aspects of human behaviour [34,45].
Economic models, for example, often include the phe-
nomenon of time discounting, whereby losses or gains
anticipated to take place in the long term are consid-
ered less important than those occurring in the short
term. This phenomenon could be included in models of
lengthy epidemics where discounting may play a role in
the decision-making processes of both individuals and
social planners. Another aspect we have not considered is
the role of memory and habitual behaviour; in our model,
individuals respond instantaneously to the current con-
ditions and do not remember what has happened in the
past. Other researchers [46] have incorporated memory
intomodels of behavioural response to epidemics, and this
is something that could usefully be added to our model.
The results of this paper raise the question of how indi-
viduals respond to the threat of disease in the real world.
There is surprisingly limited quantitative data available
about changes in social interactions during historical epi-
demics. Surveys and questionnaires can provide static
snapshots of behaviour but only limited information about
changes over time and in response to infection pressure.
For obvious reasons, it is not possible to run experiments
involving induced epidemics in the real world. A promis-
ing alternative which we are currently pursuing is to use
virtual experiments based on agent-based simulations of
epidemics in which human beings participate and control
the responses of the agents [47].
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